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NOTE
SOLOMON'S MINES: THE EXPLOSION
OVER ON-CAMPUS MILITARY RECRUITING
AND WHY THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT
TRUMPS LAW SCHOOL NON-
DISCRIMINATION POLICIES
PATRICK J. SMITHt
Yale Law School ... believes that, under the U.S. Constitution,
no one may be required, as a condition of federal funding, to
promote a message of employment discrimination ....
... The School looks forward to the day when all members of its
community have an equal opportunity to serve in the nation's
Armed Forces. 1
Effective recruitment is essential to sustain an all-volunteer
military, particularly in a time of war .... The Solomon
Amendment reflects Congress's judgment that a crucial
component of an effective military recruitment program is equal
access to college and university campuses.
2
t J.D. Candidate, June 2006, St. John's University School of Law; M.A., 2002,
The American University; B.A., 2000, St. John's University. In the interest of full
disclosure, the author of this Note participated in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate
General's Corps Summer Intern Program (Summer 2004). The views expressed
within this Note are solely those of the author.
1 Yale Law School, Current Issues: Military Recruitment at Yale Law School,
@YLS-NEWS, May 4, 2005, http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/htmPublicAffairs/
576/yls-article.htm.
2 Charles Lane, Court to Review Military Recruiting at Colleges; Law Schools
Challenge Rule Requiring Universities to Give Equal Access or Risk Losing Funding,
WASH. POST, May 3, 2005, at A02 (quoting brief from Acting Solicitor General Paul
D. Clement).
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INTRODUCTION
The on-campus recruiting season can be one of the most
difficult components of the already trying task of preparing to
become a lawyer. Each fall, many legal employers arrange
meetings with second and third-year law students that will
eventually "determine [the students'] initial career
assignments."3 Adding to the tension inherent in this process is
a recent controversy between legal recruiters for the armed
services and law schools that feel the military, as an employer,
violates the non-discrimination policies adopted by the
Association of American Law Schools.4
The ability of the United States Congress to "raise and
support" an effective military is a clearly enumerated
Constitutional power. 5 The Supreme Court has determined this
power to be plenary in a variety of circumstances that recognize
the wide scope of Congress' authority to build and govern the
3 Tom Ginsburg & Jeffrey A. Wolf, The Market for Elite Law Firm Associates, 31
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 909, 910 (2004). The authors describe the on-campus recruiting
process as a "war... [that] results in stiff competition." Id. at 911.
4 See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld (FAIR I1), 390
F.3d 219, 224-28 (3d Cir. 2004) (concerning a law school's desire to rely on non-
discrimination policy to bar military recruiting due to the military's policy on
homosexuals), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005); Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp.
2d 156, 159 (D. Conn. 2005) (same); Burbank v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-5497, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17509, at *4-6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2004) (same); Student Members of
SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d 388, 390-92 (D. Conn. 2004) (same). See
generally Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Challenging the Wisdom of Solomon:
The First Amendment and Military Recruitment on Campus, 13 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 205 (2004); Sylvia Law, Civil Rights Under Attack By the Military, 7 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 117 (2001); Francisco Valdes, Solomon's Shames: Law As Might and
Inequality, 23 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 351 (1998); Robin Ingli, Essay, Gays in the
Military: A Policy Analysis of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and the Solomon Amendment,
20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 89 (1998); Amy Kapczynski, Comment, Queer
Brinkmanship: Citizenship and the Solomon Wars, 112 YALE L.J. 673 (2002); Sean
Roaney, Note, Discrimination Under Law: The Solomon Amendment, 6 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 21 (1999); Richard Schaen, Comment, Challenging "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
The Future of Military Recruitment on Public Law School Campuses, 65 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1359 (1997); LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, INFORMATION FOR LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDERED APPLICANTS (2004), http://www.lsac.org/LSAC/LGBT/
LGBT2005web.pdf; Memorandum from Carl C. Monk, Executive Vice President and
Executive Director of the Association of American Law Schools, to Deans of Member
and Fee-Paid Schools (Feb. 9, 2000), http://www.aals.org/00-6.html [hereinafter
Memorandum from Carl C. Monk to Deans].
5 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the authority to "raise
and support Armies"); id. § 8, cl. 13 (authorizing Congress to "provide and maintain
a Navy"); id. § 8, cl. 14 (delineating the power of Congress to "make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces").
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military. 6 One of the chief ways the U.S. military seeks to
accomplish this mandate is through the recruitment of well-
qualified officers to lead the various branches of the Armed
Forces. 7 Among the vast array of officers employed throughout
the military is a group of practicing attorneys commissioned for
service in the Judge Advocate General's Corps ("JAG").8 Though
each branch of the military utilizes its own methods for the
selection of Judge Advocates, each relies on the on-campus
interviewing and recruiting process typical of employers within
the legal profession. 9 The United States Army, for instance,
sends an officer to conduct screenings at nearly every accredited
law school in the country.10
The Association of American Law Schools ("AALS" or the
"Association")11 enjoys an authority among its member law
schools similar in practical effect to the plenary powers of the
federal Congress. A principle criterion for membership in the
AALS is compliance by members of the Association with the by-
laws set forth by the organization as a whole. 12 According to the
6 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) ("The constitutional
power of Congress to raise and support armies and to make all laws necessary and
proper to that end is broad and sweeping."). Though it may have varying
connotations, the term "military" will be used throughout this Note to refer to the
United States Armed Forces, including the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and
Coast Guard, as well as the Reserve and National Guard components of each branch.
7 See 10 U.S.C. § 503(a) (2000) (requiring the armed forces to "conduct intensive
recruiting campaigns to obtain enlistments").
s See generally Army JAG Corps, Overview, http://www.goarmy.comjag/
index.jsp (last visited Sept. 16, 2005); Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps,
Careers, http://www.jag.navy.mil/Careers/Careers3.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2005);
Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Mission,
http://sja.hqmc.usmc.mil/SJAOrg.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2005); U.S. Air Force
Judge Advocate Recruiting, How Can I Become an Air Force Judge Advocate?,
http://www.jagusaf.hq.af.mil/EDprgrms/howtobecome.htm (last visited Sept. 16,
2005).
9 See supra note 8.
10 Eugene Y. Kim, The Judge Advocate Recruiting Office: The Gateway to
Service, 2004 ARMY LAW. 33, 34 (2004).
11 The AALS states that "[t]he purpose of the association is 'the improvement of
the legal profession through legal education.' It serves as the learned society for law
teachers and is legal education's principal representative to the federal government
and to other national higher education organizations and learned societies."
American Association of Law Schools, What is the AALS?, http://www.aals.org/
about.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
12 Membership in the AALS is determined by a "four or five person team [that]
visits the applicant school to determine its compliance with the Association's
Bylaws." Id.
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Association's core values, as laid out in its by-laws, opposing
discrimination is a chief goal of the AALS.1 3 To that effect, the
AALS opposes discrimination on the basis of several factors and
in several contexts and encourages its members to do the same.' 4
Every member law school, therefore, publishes a non-
discrimination policy announcing its commitment to prohibiting
intolerance based on certain protected categories.1 5 In 1990, the
AALS chose to add sexual orientation to its list of protected
categories in an effort to prevent potential institutional bias
against homosexual students and faculty.' 6  The non-
discrimination policies of member law schools are meant to cover
all aspects of law school administration, 17  including the
recruitment process by which legal employers seek out law
students for summer or post-graduation employment.1 8
It is in the recruiting context that the U.S. military and the
AALS, as well as some of its member institutions, have run
squarely into one another. The military uses on-campus
recruiting to seek out new Judge Advocates as well as interns for
summer JAG Corps internships. 19 As mentioned, the AALS has
sought to ensure that this process is free of discrimination.2 0
However, since the military continues to operate with the "Don't
'3 Bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools, Inc. § 6-1(b)(iv), available
at http://www.aals.orglbylaws.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter AALS
Bylaws] (articulating that the AALS' core values include a commitment to "a diverse
faculty and staff hired, promoted, and retained based on meeting and supporting
high standards of teaching and scholarship and in accordance with principles of non-
discrimination").
14 The Bylaw states:
A member school shall provide equality of opportunity in legal education
for all persons, including faculty and employees with respect to hiring,
continuation, promotion and tenure, applicants for admission, enrolled
students, and graduates, without discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, disability, or sexual
orientation.
Id. § 6-3(a).
15 See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
16 See Law, supra note 4, at 121; Ingli, supra note 4, at 99.
17 See supra note 14.
18 See AALS Bylaws, supra note 13, § 6-3(b) ("A member school shall
communicate to each employer to whom it furnishes assistance and facilities for
interviewing and other placement functions the school's firm expectation that the
employer will observe the principle of equal opportunity.").
19 See Kim, supra note 10, at 34.
20 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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Ask, Don't Tell"21 policy regarding service by homosexual military
personnel, the AALS considers the military, in its capacity as a
potential employer, to be in contravention of its non-
discrimination directive. 22  After the adoption of sexual
orientation as a protected category in 1990, law schools were
required to ban military recruiting on-campus 23-that is, until
Congress answered back with passage of the Solomon
Amendment. 24 This controversial piece of legislation was offered
by then U.S. Representative Gerald Solomon of New York ("Rep.
Solomon") as an amendment to Congress' authorization of
Department of Defense ("DOD" or "DoD") spending for 1995.25
Though it has taken on different forms, the Solomon Amendment
essentially requires colleges and universities, including the law
schools within them, to permit military recruiting on-campus as
a condition of receiving certain kinds of federal funding.26 Rather
than force member law schools to risk losing their own funding or
jeopardize the funding of their parent university, the AALS has
permitted law schools to allow JAG recruiting, even though such
is still considered a violation of its non-discrimination policy.27
Not surprisingly, several law school faculty members and
students, as well as associations made up of them, have
challenged the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment in a
string of recent cases. In Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights v. Rumsfeld,28 Burbank v. Rumsfeld,29 Student Members of
SAME v. Rumsfeld,30 and Burt v. Rumsfeld,31 the plaintiffs have
21 See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000); see also infra Part II (discussing the military's
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy).
22 See Law, supra note 4, at 122-23 (recognizing that prior to the Solomon
Amendment, the AALS required its member schools to prohibit on-campus military
recruiting); Ingli, supra note 4, at 99 (noting that since the military would not certify
its compliance with the AALS non-discrimination policy, "military recruiters were
barred from using career services offices for on-campus interviews and were not
allowed on campus").
23 See infra Part I(B) (detailing the AALS policy on sexual orientation as a
protected category).
24 See infra Part I(C) (providing an overview of the history and requirements of
the Solomon Amendment).
25 See infra Part I(C) (describing the development and purpose of the Solomon
Amendment).
26 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West & Supp. 2005).
27 See Memorandum from Carl C. Monk to Deans, supra note 4.
28 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005).
29 No. 03-5497, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2004).
30 321 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Conn. 2004).
31 354 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2005).
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argued that the Solomon Amendment violates their First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and expressive
association, and in some instances their Fifth Amendment equal
protection and due process rights.32 Part I of this Note will
discuss the history and directives of the Solomon Amendment.
Part II will briefly outline the U.S. military's "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy regarding homosexuals in the armed forces. Part III
will explore the claims raised by the plaintiffs in cases
challenging the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment.
Finally, Part IV will explain why, for better or worse, the
concerns of those who oppose the Solomon Amendment must
yield to the powers of Congress.
I. A HISTORY OF THE BATTLE OVER ATTEMPTS To BAN MILITARY
RECRUITING
A. Pre-Solomon Congressional Funding Requirements
The passage of the Solomon Amendment in 1994 was not the
first time the federal government sought to prohibit the barring
of military recruiters on campuses. 33  Indeed, Rep. Solomon
himself felt that passage of the amendment would do no more
than "simply ... enforc[e] existing law."34  The controversy
between the military's recruiting efforts and the colleges within
which these efforts are undertaken goes back at least to the
Vietnam War era.35 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, in an
effort to ensure that the military continued to have access to
32 See infra Part III (providing an overview of the claims presented by the
plaintiffs in cases challenging the Solomon Amendment).
3 See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld (FAIR 1),
291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted,
125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005). The district court noted, "A policy of discouraging barriers to
on-campus military recruitment pre-dates the 1994 passage of the Solomon
Amendment by nearly thirty years." Id. at 278 (citing United States v. City of
Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 86 (3d Cir. 1986). Although the district court decision was
reversed on appeal, the opinion contains a thorough treatment of the history and
issues present in the litigation. It will, therefore, be referenced throughout this Note
as a source of information.
34 140 CONG. REC. H11439 (daily ed. May 23, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Solomon).
35 See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 278 ("Congress enacted legislation in the
1960s and 1970s that, much like the Solomon Amendment, authorized the
withholding of defense funds from schools that maintained a policy barring military
recruiters or otherwise eliminated the Reserve Officers Training Corps program.").
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college campuses for the purposes of recruiting, Congress, in
several appropriations bills, conditioned the receipt of various
federal funds on the effectuation of policies that met this goal, or
at least did not inhibit it.36 The 1973 DOD Authorization Act, for
instance, made it clear that a college could not expect to receive
federal funds if it was found to prohibit military recruiters from
accessing its campus.37  The gauntlet, it seemed, had been
thrown down.
B. Just Leave Your Money at the Door!-Law School Action in
the Pre-Solomon Era
Universities and their law schools did not respond to the pre-
Solomon appropriations bills directly. Rather than engage in
outright protest, many law schools adopted universal non-
discrimination policies and relied on those policies to prohibit any
discriminatory employer from accessing their campuses. 38 As far
back as 1978, New York University School of Law ("NYU Law")
adopted "a policy of equal treatment of its faculty, students, and
staff members, without regard to sex, sexual orientation, marital
or parental status, race, color, religion, national origin, age, or
handicap." 39  It was the first of its kind in an American law
school,40 and served as the basis by which NYU Law would make
unavailable its career placement office to employers who did not
adhere to the principles of the policy.41 That same year, Yale
Law School implemented a similar non-discrimination policy 42
36 See id. (citing the Department of Defense Authorization Acts of 1973 and
1971, as well as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization
Acts of 1969, each of which authorized the withholding of federal funds to colleges
and universities that bar military recruiting).
37 Id. (referencing the 1973 DOD Authorization Act's strong funding prohibition
language). The DOD Authorization Act of 1973 stated:
No part of the funds appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act for the
Department of Defense or any of the Armed Forces may be used at any
institution of higher learning if ... recruiting personnel ... are being
barred by the policy of such institution from the premises of the
institution ....
Pub. L. No. 92-436, § 606(a), 86 Stat. 734, 740 (1972).
38 See Law, supra note 4, at 120-21.
39 Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 166 (D. Conn. 2005) (explaining
that in 1978 Yale Law School prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation); see also Yale Law School Career Development Office,
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and has since refused the services of its Career Development
Office to employers who will not declare their compliance with
the policy.43 Several law schools soon followed the lead of NYU
and Yale. 44
The AALS was next to act. In 1990, the House of
Representatives of the AALS made a unanimous decision to
include "sexual orientation" as a category to be protected from
discrimination in all aspects of law school life. 45 Specifically,
AALS Bylaw Section 6-3(b) provides that a "member school shall
pursue a policy of providing its students and graduates with
equal opportunity to obtain employment, without discrimination
or segregation on the' ground of ... sexual orientation."46
Further, the Association obligates member schools to make all
potential employers aware of AALS Bylaw Section 6-3 and
receive an employer's pledge to honor the non-discrimination
policy contained therein.47 These provisions are listed under
Article 6 of the Association's Bylaws, entitled "Requirements of
Membership." 48 Because compliance with the AALS' bylaws is a
criterion for accreditation by the Association, 49 it is not
surprising that "all of the more than [then] 160 member law
http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/CareerDevelopment/cdo-index.htm (last
visited Sept. 16, 2005). The Non-Discrimination Policy of Yale Law School states,
"Yale Law School is committed to a policy against discrimination based upon age,
color, handicap or disability, ethnic or national origin, race, religion, religious creed,
gender (including discrimination taking the form of sexual harassment), marital,
parental or veteran status, sexual orientation, or the prejudice of clients." Id.
(emphasis added).
43 See Yale Law School Career Development Office, supra note 42. The Yale
policy also explicitly states that, "All employers using the school's placement services
are required to abide by [the] policy." Id.; see also Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 165-68
(describing the background to the plaintiff school's non-discrimination policy and the
Solomon Amendment); Student Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d 388,
390 (D. Conn. 2004) (detailing the history of the plaintiffs' school's non-
discrimination policy in the context of challenging the Solomon Amendment).
44 See Law, supra note 4, at 120-21; see also Ingli, supra note 4, at 99 ("For
years .... law schools... have adhered to nondiscrimination policies that include
sexual orientation.").
45 AALS Bylaws, supra note 13, § 6-3; see also Law, supra note 4, at 121; Ingli,
supra note 4, at 99.
46 AALS Bylaws, supra note 13, § 6-3(b).
47 Id. ("A member school shall communicate to each employer to whom it
furnishes assistance and facilities for interviewing and other placement functions
the school's firm expectation that the employer will observe the principle of equal
opportunity.").
48 Id. §§ 6-1 to 6-10.
49 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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schools of the AALS extended their non-discrimination policies to
cover sexual orientation."50  For reasons that will be explained
more fully below, the military could not take the kind of non-
discrimination policy compliance oath that was effectively
required of every employer seeking access to law school
placement offices across the country.
C. Rep. Solomon's Easy "Rider"--Firing Back by Amendment
The attempts by the AALS and its member schools to
prevent the military from on-campus recruiting were seemingly,
if only temporarily, successful. In 1994, a congressionally
authorized study determined that at least 140 colleges and
universities "ha[d] denied recruiters access to their
campus[es]." 51 In response, Congress passed an amendment to
the 1995 Defense Department spending bill, which was proposed
by Rep. Solomon.5 2 This amendment sought to deny certain DOD
funds to institutions of higher education, as well as subelements
of those institutions, that prohibited campus access to military
recruiters.53 However, this proposed legislation did not have its
sponsor's desired effect "because law schools receive little if any
DoD funding."54 Consequently, Rep. Solomon proposed another
amendment, this time to the Omnibus Consolidated
50 FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 280 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005) (exemplifying the AALS' commitment to
improving the legal profession through legal education, as in 1990 when it voted to
include sexual orientation as a protected category in non-discrimination policies).
51 140 CONG. REC. S15500 (daily ed. July 1, 1994) (statement of Sen. Nickles).
52 See FAIR 1, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (relying on legislative history to support
the claim that "[tihe apparent impetus for the Solomon Amendment was the
continued refusal of many educational institutions to allow the military to engage in
on-campus recruiting').
In support of his amendment, Rep. Solomon urged that the proposal was
designed to
tell[] recipients of Federal money at colleges and universities that if [they]
do not like the Armed Forces, if [they] do not like its policies, that is fine.
That is [their] first-amendment rights. But do not expect Federal dollars to
support [their] interference with 0 military recruiters.
140 CONG. REC. H11439 (daily ed. May 23, 1994) (statement of Rep. Solomon).
53 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-
337, § 558(a), 108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.A. § 983
(West & Supp. 2005)).
54 Kapczynski, supra note 4, at 675; see also Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d
156, 167 (D. Conn. 2005) (noting that "[1law schools ... are not typically recipients of
large amounts of federal funding'); Law, supra note 4, at 121 (stating that "[t]he
Solomon Amendment posed no problem for law schools or the AALS").
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Appropriations Act of 199755 that expanded the reach of the
original Solomon Amendment to federal "funds made available in
this or any other Departments of Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act."5 6  Additionally, the funding limitations of the new
amendment were to be applied to any "grant of funds to be
available for student aid."57
The restrictions on student aid, however, were apparently a
step too far. As a result, Congress passed an amendment in
1999, which was introduced by Representative Barney Frank of
Massachusetts and Representative Tom Campbell of California.
This amendment made the limitations no longer applicable to
funds "available solely for student financial assistance or related
administrative costs." 58 After a relatively short yet complicated
history, 59 the Solomon Amendment currently provides that
certain categories 60 of federal funds
may [not] be provided by contract or by grant to an institution of
higher education (including any subelement of such institution)
if the Secretary of Defense determines that that institution (or
any subelement of that institution) has a policy or practice
(regardless of when implemented) that either prohibits, or in
effect prevents-
(1) the Secretary of a military department or Secretary of
Homeland Security from gaining access to campuses or
access to students (who are 17 years of age or older) on
campuses, for purposes of military recruiting .... 61
55 Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 514(b), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-271 (1996), repealed by
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 549,
113 Stat. 512, 609-11 (1999). It is important to note that though parts of the 1996
amendment were repealed, the Solomon Amendment is in full effect as codified as 10
U.S.C.A. § 983 (West & Supp. 2005).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-79, §
8120, 113 Stat. 1212, 1260 (1999).
59 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 225-28 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
1977 (2005) (discussing the original amendment and subsequent federal actions as
they relate to it); Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 166-68 (detailing the legislative history of
the Solomon Amendment); Law, supra note 4, at 121-23 (describing the history of
law school actions in response to changes in the Solomon Amendment); Kapczynski,
supra note 4, at 673-76 (reviewing changes in the Solomon Amendment over time).
60 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(d)(1)(A)-(F) (West Supp. 2005) (listing categories of
funds covered by the Solomon Amendment).
61 Id. § 983(b). Additional amendments were made to the Solomon Amendment
in 2002 to indicate the newly created Department of Homeland Security and
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As to how compliance by a particular institution is to be
gauged, a 2004 addition to the Solomon Amendment requires
that the military be allowed admission to recruit "in a manner
that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to
campuses and to students that is provided to any other
employer." 62 Previously, this language had merely been part of
the Defense Department's regulations interpreting the
recruitment law.63
D. Implementation of the Solomon Amendment and the AALS
Response
Since the Solomon Amendment grants the Secretary of
Defense the discretion to determine whether or not an institution
of higher education is in compliance with the law, the DOD is
authorized to promulgate regulations as to how the amendment
will be implemented. 64 The DOD's initial interpretation of the
statute was to deny federal funds only to the subelement itself
(e.g., a law school) and not the parent institution.65 As such, the
AALS continued to mandate that member institutions prohibit
military recruiting because the first version of the Solomon
Amendment was "inconsequential."66
substitute it for the Department of Transportation in the bill. See 10 U.S.C. § 983(b),
as amended by Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 1704(b)(1), (g), 116 Stat. 2314, 2316 (2002).
62 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,
Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 552(a)(2), 118 Stat. 1811, 1911 (2004).
63 See Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (noting that the access requirement in the
former regulation was intended as a "safe harbor provision," but that it is now "an
affirmative duty").
In wording the new ... substantive requirement, the DOD borrowed
language from the existing policy's regulatory exception-32 C.F.R. 216.4(c)
(exempting from Solomon Act compliance a law school that 'presents
evidence that the degree of access by military recruiters is at least equal in
quality and scope to that afforded to other employers').
FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 227 n.6.
64 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983.
65 See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, 61 Fed. Reg. 7739,
7740 (Feb. 29, 1996); see also Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (reviewing the DOD's
original regulation and determining that "if a subelement of a university, like a law
school, denied access to military recruiters, then only that subelement would lose
funding, not the entire institution"); Law, supra note 4, at 121 (asserting that a non-
compliant law school, for instance, risked losing funding going only to itself and not
the entire college or university).
66 Valdes, supra note 4, at 354. Francisco Valdes, the author of the cited article,
was the 1997 Chair of the AALS Section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues. See id.
n.* .
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In 1997, however, after the Solomon Amendment was
amended to include funds distributed by other federal
departments, including educational funds, the AALS allowed law
schools to decide for themselves whether or not to comply, 67 even
though "the applicable regulations continued to cabin the
consequences of a subelement's failure to grant access to military
recruiters to that subelement itself, such that non-compliance did
not affect the university as a whole."68 The AALS did so because
educational loans-at that time subject to limitation at the
Secretary of Defense's judgment of non-compliance-were
"significant to many schools."69  The requirement to bar
discriminatory employers from on-campus recruiting was
replaced, however, with the passage of the 1999 Frank-Campbell
Amendment, which withdrew from DOD limitation federal funds
meant exclusively for student financial aid. 70
The claims at issue in the recent cases challenging the
Solomon Amendment arose out of the DOD's most recent
interpretation of the statute.71 In 2000, the DOD issued new
interim regulations that were to become effective immediately, 72
and which have since become permanent. 73 The new regulations
state that an "[i]nstitution of higher education. . . includes all
subelements of such an institution."74 This change abolished the
previous law school policy which "treated schools and colleges
67 See Law, supra note 4, at 122 (quoting Memorandum 96-15 from Carl Monk,
Executive Vice President and Executive Director of the AALS, to Deans of Member
and Fee-paid Schools (May 28, 1996)).
68 Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 167.
69 Valdes, supra note 4, at 355; see also Roaney, supra note 4, at 21 (estimating
potential losses of federal funds to law schools in real-dollar amounts as anywhere
between $500,000 to $1,000,000).
70 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
71 See Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 168-70 (explaining how the suit arose out of the
DOD's advisement that the law school was not in compliance with current federal
requirements); Burbank v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-5497, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509, at
*4-6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2004) (describing the controversy as growing out of the law
school's non-compliance with the Solomon Amendment under current DOD
regulations); Student Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d 388, 390-92
(D. Conn. 2004) (discussing the student-plaintiffs' belief that the present
construction of the Solomon Amendment was "unreasonable" and identifying current
conflict as arising out of law school's non-compliance).
72 See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Institutions of
Higher Education, 65 Fed. Reg. 2056, 2056-57 (Jan. 13, 2000) (codified at 48 C.F.R.
§ 209.470 (2004)).
73 See 48 C.F.R. § 209.470 (2004).
74 Id. (emphasis added).
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within a university as independent actors."75 Consequently, if a
law school was found to be in contravention of the dictates of the
Solomon Amendment, the funding of the entire parent institution
would become eligible for limitation at the direction of the
Secretary of Defense.7 6 This is the case at least as to funds
flowing from the DOD; funds appropriated by the other
departments listed in the Solomon Amendment will only be
denied to the subelement deemed in violation of the statute.77 As
a direct result of the new regulations, the AALS and its member
institutions have been forced to lift their non-discrimination
policies as applied to military recruiters.
78
II. "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL": THE POLICY THAT LAUNCHED A
THOUSAND HARDSHIPS
The storm swirling around the rather short life of the
Solomon Amendment pales in comparison to the whirlwind of
controversy surrounding the U.S. military's "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy.7 9 The dawn of the Clinton administration brought to
the public's attention a debate over the military's approach to the
service of homosexuals in the armed forces.80 At President
75 Law, supra note 4, at 123.
76 See Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 252.209-7005 (2000)).
77 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 227 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 32 C.F.R. § 216.3(b)(1)
(2004) for the proposition that an "offending subelement's parent institution is
penalized with the loss of only DOD funds").
78 See Law, supra note 4, at 123; see also Burbank v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-5497,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2004) ("Under the threat of
losing federal funding because of alleged noncompliance, the University President
ordered the Law School not to enforce its anti-discrimination policy against military
recruiters."); FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 284 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005) ("As of the fall 2003 recruiting
season, every law school in the nation that receives federal funds has suspended
permanently their non-discrimination policies as applied to military recruiters.").
79 See Law, supra note 4, at 119 ("The 'don't ask, don't tell' policy adopted by the
Clinton administration in 1996 has been a disaster."); Diane H. Mazur, Word Games,
War Games, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1590, 1590 (2000) ("The issue of military service by
gay citizens became... a cultural standoff .... "); Schaen, supra note 4, at 1365-66
("Unless the... policy is changed or declared unconstitutional, gay-rights
supporters will be forced to find other ways of protesting it.").
80 See, e.g., Mazur, supra note 79, at 1590 (portraying America's interest in
military service by gays in the early 1990s as an "obsession"); Aaron A. Seamon,
Comment, The Flawed Compromise of 10 U.S.C. § 654: An Assessment of the
Military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 319, 324-25 (1999)
(discussing public policy debate surrounding gays in the military at the start of the
Clinton administration).
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Clinton's urging, "Congress began exploring a legislative solution
to the problem."8' The result was the 1993 compromise
commonly called "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."8 2  The policy's basic
arrangement permits homosexuals to serve in the military by
making it unlawful to inquire about the sexual orientation of
service-members,8 3 while also prohibiting those serving in the
military from disclosing their homosexuality by word or by
deed.8 4
Since "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" continues to mandate silence on
the issue of sexual orientation,8 5 "[m]any... believe that it is just
the latest incarnation of a long-standing ban on homosexuals in
the military."8 6  Despite the fact that the policy has routinely
81 Seamon, supra note 80, at 325.
82 Id. at 327.
83 See Schaen, supra note 4, at 1362-63 ("[Clommanders are not permitted to
conduct investigations for the purpose of determining a service member's sexual
orientation."); Gavin W. Scotti, Jr., Note, Queer Eye for the Military Guy: Will 'Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" Survive in the Wake of Lawrence v. Texas?, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
897, 898 & n.5 (2004) (citing Aaron Belkin, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Is the Gay Ban
Based on Military Necessity?, PARAMETERS, Summer 2003, at 108, available at
http://carlisle-www.army.millusawc/parameters/O3summerbelkin.pdf) (summarizing
the history of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy)).
84 See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000):
POLICY.-A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed
forces ... if one or more of the following findings is made... :(1)That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or
solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts unless. . . the
member has demonstrated that-
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and
customary behavior;
(B) such conduct, under all circumstances, is unlikely to recur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or
intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's
continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the
interests of the armed forces in proper discipline, good order, and
morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts.
(2)That the member has stated that he or she is a
homosexual.., unless there is a further finding... that the member
has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in,
attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to
engage in homosexual acts.
85 See Scotti, supra note 83, at 900 (noting that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" was
repeatedly upheld by federal circuit courts and that the Supreme Court has not
ruled as to its constitutionality).
86 Ingli, supra note 4, at 89.
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been upheld as constitutional, 7 many individuals continue to
view the law as discriminatory against homosexuals.88 Though
the current conflict between law schools and the military centers
on the Solomon Amendment, it is the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy that undergirds the entire controversy.
8 9
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL CLINIC: STUDENTS AND FACULTY
87 See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 636 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy does not violate the Equal Protection Clause);
Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy does not violate the First Amendment, stating that
although an "'admission... [is] made in speech.... that does not mean that the
First Amendment precludes the use of the admission as evidence of the facts
admitted"' (quoting Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 1991))); Philips
v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy against Equal Protection and First Amendment claims); Richenberg v.
Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 261 (8th Cir. 1996) ('Ve join six other circuits in concluding that
the military may exclude those who engage in homosexual acts ...."); Thomasson v.
Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 931 (4th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy withstands First Amendment attack and reasoning that the pertinent law
"does not target speech declaring homosexuality; rather, it targets homosexual acts
and the propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, and permissibly uses the
speech as evidence"); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 691-93 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(deciding that the dismissal of openly gay Navy midshipmen under the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy does not raise valid First Amendment or Equal Protection claims).
But see Scotti, supra note 83 (discussing whether the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
will be upheld as constitutional following the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), which granted privacy rights to homosexual
conduct).
88 See Law, supra note 4, at 119 ("[Tlhe military stands out as an anomaly as it
pursues an open, explicit policy of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation."); Ingli, supra note 4, at 89 ("The military's policy on homosexuals is
considered discriminatory .. "); Schaen, supra note 4, at 1359 ("The military
discriminates against homosexuals.").
89 See generally FAIR II, 390 F. 3d 219, 224-28 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125
S. Ct. 1977 (2005) (discussing that the suit arose out of the law school's reliance on a
non-discrimination policy which barred military recruiting due to the discriminatory
effect of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy under the Solomon Amendment); Burt v.
Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 168 (D. Conn. 2005) ("In light of Congress's ... 'Don't
Ask, Don't Tell' policy, [the Department of Defense] has refused to certify its
compliance with [Yale] Law School's [Nondiscrimination Policy]. As a result .... [it]
has been denied use of the [Career Development Office] since 1978."); Burbank v.
Rumsfeld, No. 03-5497, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2004)
(noting that the lawsuit originated due to the military's inability to "verify [to the
university's career services office] that it does not discriminate against its gay and
lesbian members"); Student Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d 388,
390 (D. Conn. 2004) ("In light of the military's ... 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy, the
Department of Defense has refused to certify its compliance with [Yale] Law School's
[Nondiscrimination Policy] and has thus been denied the use of [its] Career
Development Office.").
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CHALLENGE THE MILITARY
Recently, associations comprised of law school faculty and
students have brought suits challenging the constitutionality of
the Solomon Amendment. 90 With minor variations on a general
theme, the plaintiffs in these cases have asserted that the statute
violates their constitutional rights as embodied in the First and
Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 91 The claims
asserted by the plaintiffs involved in these cases will be discussed
in turn.
In Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 92
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court
decision that held that the Solomon Amendment would likely be
found constitutional.93  The plaintiff, FAIR, an organization
comprised of law schools and faculty members, asserted that the
Solomon Amendment placed an unconstitutional condition on the
distribution of government funds by penalizing law schools for
exercising their First Amendment rights.94 The plaintiffs first
argued that a law school qualifies as an expressive association,
and as such, the government cannot impair their ability to
effectively "disseminate their chosen message." 95  Furthermore,
they urged the court to find that the First Amendment protected
their freedom from being forced "to propagate, accommodate, and
subsidize the military's [expressive act of] recruiting."96  The
Solomon Amendment, according to FAIR, impermissibly treads
on these two distinct First Amendment speech interests and,
thus, a preliminary injunction should have been granted. 97 For
90 See, e.g., FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 224; Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59; Burbank,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *1-2; Student Members of SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
91 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 230, 235-36, 243 (listing First Amendment claims
under the doctrines of expressive association, compelled speech, and expressive
conduct); Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (describing plaintiffs' assertion that
adherence to the Solomon Amendment "violates their freedoms of speech and
association and violates their substantive due process right of educational
autonomy"); Burbank, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509, at *6 (commenting that the
plaintiffs challenged the Solomon Amendment on First and Fifth Amendment
grounds); Student Members of SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 390 (observing that the
lawsuit was based upon First and Fifth Amendment claims).
92 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005).
93 See id. at 224.
94 See id. at 224, 229.
95 Id. at 233.
96 Id. at 236.
97 See id. at 230 (noting the law schools' First Amendment right to expressive
association and freedom from compelled speech).
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reasons that will be explored more fully below, the Third Circuit
found that FAIR had made a strong showing, through the
doctrines of compelled speech and expressive association, that it
would likely succeed in having the Solomon Amendment be
deemed unconstitutional. 98
In Student Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld,99 two student
organizations of the Yale Law School, the Student/Faculty
Alliance for Military Equality ("SAME") and Outlaws, "an
organization formed with the goal of educating the Law School
community about legal issues affecting lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender persons,"'00 brought suit against the Secretary of
Defense claiming the application of the Solomon Amendment
violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights.101  The
organizations' first claim was that the Solomon Amendment
infringed on their freedom of expressive association-a liberty
"implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment." 10 2  Government actions that intruded into an
association's affairs, the court explained, may have violated this
constitutional right.'0 3
The student groups urged that the Solomon Amendment
compelled the law school to abandon its non-discrimination policy
and, thus, forced onto the law school-their association-a
message of intolerance with which it disagrees.' 0 4 The court,
however, determined that the organizations did not have
standing to pursue this associational claim because they do not
set the policies of the law school.' 0 5 The court relied on a similar
justification (that the students were not proper parties) for
rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that the Solomon Amendment
represented viewpoint discrimination. 0 6 To support their claim,
the students unsuccessfully asserted that the DOD's application
of the Solomon Amendment discriminated against Yale Law
School because of its choice to be an association that does not
98 See id. at 246.
99 321 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Conn. 2004).
100 Id. at 390.
101 See id.
102 Id. at 393 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984)).
103 See id. (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).
104 See id. at 393-94.
105 See id. at 394.
106 See id. at 395.
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discriminate against gays and lesbians. 107
The plaintiffs further argued that they had a constitutional
right to receive information, such as the message of tolerance
expressed in the law school's non-discrimination policy.108 This is
a right that has not only been recognized, but also deemed
"particularly important for students."'0 9 The court permitted this
challenge because
[t]he students have alleged that they are recipients of the
faculty's message, through the [non-discrimination policy], that
discrimination against gays and lesbians is wrong and will not
be tolerated within the law school community, and that, but for
the Solomon Amendment and the defendant's application of it,
they would receive that message. 110
The court also permitted the student organizations to pursue
their equal protection argument against the DOD.1" The
students claimed that the statute in question was specifically
aimed at ending protests against the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy at colleges and universities. 112 Additionally, the student
organizations argued that the Solomon Amendment obliged the
law school to lift its non-discrimination policy." 3 As such, the
law singled out homosexual students for unequal treatment since
it mandated that the law school allow a recruiter, with whom gay
student members of the plaintiff-organizations were forbidden to
meet, to come on campus. 1 4 Though the court noted that its
circuit has upheld "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," it recognized that the
calculus for standing and for the likelihood of success on the
merits of the claim are different, and consequently, determined
that the Solomon Amendment could be challenged as causing
107 See id.
108 See id. at 394.
109 Id. (quoting Fox v. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y., 841 F.2d 1207, 1212 (2d
Cir. 1988)).
110 Id. at 395.
111 See id. at 396.
112 See id.
113 See id. 395-96 (discussing the argument that the law school faculty was
essentially forced to suspend the non-discrimination policy because of the threats
aimed at the school).
114 See id. at 395-96. While no students are actually denied the right to meet
with a military recruiter, openly gay students would find their on-campus interviews
fruitless at best because the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy demands silence as to
one's sexuality.
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prejudicial treatment of the plaintiffs' homosexual members. 115
In Burt v. Rumsfeld,1" 6 a companion case to Student
Members of SAME, members of the Yale Law School faculty
challenged the Solomon Amendment as an intrusion on their
First Amendment freedom of expressive association and on Fifth
Amendment due process grounds. 117 Here, the court permitted
the expressive association claim that it had denied the plaintiffs
in Student Members of SAME." 8 The faculty raised the same
associational arguments as the members of SAME and Outlaws,
but were deemed to have standing since the faculty was the party
that voted to implement the non-discrimination policy (i.e.,
determine the rules of the association).1 1 9
The faculty-plaintiffs also asserted that the Solomon
Amendment infringed on their freedom of association and right
to not be compelled to speak. 120 They argued that the adoption of
the non-discrimination policy was designed to send a message
that "discrimination will not be tolerated."' 2' In enacting the
non-discrimination policy, the Yale faculty sought to apply it
universally within the law school, including extending it to
employers who recruit at Yale.' 22 Since the Solomon Amendment
conditioned funding on allowing military recruiting at the law
school, the plaintiffs argued that the law required them to silence
their message of non-discrimination, thus violating their freedom
of speech.' 23
The faculty also raised a Fifth Amendment due process claim
against the Secretary of Defense.' 24 Though the argument in
Burt as to this issue is not entirely clear, the basic assertion by
the plaintiffs was that substantive due process protects
"educational autonomy" as well as the student-teacher
relationship, 125 and that the Solomon Amendment hampered this
freedom because the faculty was no longer able to oppose
115 See id.
116 354 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2005).
117 See id. at 171.
118 See id. at 185-87.
119 See id. at 160.
120 See id. at 171.
121 Id.
122 See id. at 166.
123 See id. at 171.
124 See id.
125 Id.
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discrimination and foster a protective environment for its
students. 126 Additionally, a Yale Law School professor, claimed a
denial of his First Amendment right as the Solomon Amendment
compelled him to aid in the dissemination of a message with
which he and the faculty disagree. 127 In this action, the court
determined that while no Fifth Amendment violation was found,
the Solomon Amendment placed an unconstitutional condition on
the receipt of federal funds by violating the plaintiffs' freedoms of
speech and expressive association.128
In Burbank v. Rumsfeld,129 faculty and students of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School brought suit against the
Secretary of Defense challenging the DOD's interpretation of the
Solomon Amendment and the potential enforcement of its
funding limitations against the institution. 130  The First
Amendment arguments raised by the plaintiffs were nearly
identical to those in the two other cases. 31 Indeed, the court
relied heavily on these prior cases in deciding that the faculty-
plaintiffs could pursue their claims that the Solomon
Amendment infringed upon their "First Amendment rights to free
speech, free expression, free association, and academic
freedom."'132 The court disagreed, however, as to the Fifth
Amendment arguments asserted by the plaintiffs, holding that
they did not have standing to raise equal protection or due
process challenges against the government as they failed to
articulate a cognizable injury protected by that amendment. 133
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 189-90.
129 No. 03-5497, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2004).
130 See id. at *1-2.
131 See id. at *7-11.
132 Id. at *8-9.
133 See id. at *12.
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IV. WINNING THE WAR: WHY THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT DOES
NOT INFRINGE ON FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS1
3 4
A. Overcoming Challenges Based on Freedom of Speech
The Solomon Amendment should survive any claims rooted
in the plaintiffs' freedom of speech. These First Amendment
challenges to the law have taken various forms. The plaintiffs
successfully argued in two cases that the law improperly burdens
the freedom of association, impermissibly compels speech, and
wrongly hinders expressive association. 135 A different test and
rationale applies to expressive association claims and, therefore,
that challenge will be treated separately below. 136
1. Claims Based on the Doctrines of Expressive Association and
Expressive Conduct
The Solomon Amendment, contrary to the claims of the
plaintiffs, does not directly regulate speech or the sending and
receiving of a particular message. Rather, the law most directly
regulates conduct undertaken by particular institutions. 137 The
funding limitations of the Solomon Amendment only go into
effect when an institution of higher education or a subelement
thereof "has a policy or practice ... that either prohibits, or in
effect prevents [military personnel] from gaining entry to
campuses, or access to students ... for purposes of military
134 This Note will not address the Fifth Amendment claims raised by the
plaintiffs in the above cases for two significant reasons. First, not all of the courts
addressing the challenges to the Solomon Amendment found a cognizable injury to
either due process or equal protection interests. Second, the courts that did find a
cognizable Fifth Amendment injury cast doubt upon the viability of such a claim. For
instance, the court in Student Members of SAME explained that the student-
plaintiffs' challenge of the Solomon Amendment on equal protection grounds was
"dubious at best." Student Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d 388, 396
(D. Conn. 2004). Additionally, the court in Burt held that the Solomon Amendment
did not violate substantive due process. Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 188-
89 (D. Conn. 2005). Consequently, this Note will only explore why the Solomon
Amendment should survive any First Amendment challenges.
135 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 246 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005); Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 178-83.
136 See infra Part IV.B.
137 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West & Supp. 2005); FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 306
(D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005)
("The Solomon Amendment merely conditions federal funds on campus and student
access for military recruiting ... ").
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recruiting."138 Therefore, by the language of the statute, a law
school would be denied funding not for expressing a belief that
discrimination is a bad thing, but only for attempting to give
weight to that belief by closing its doors to military recruiters.
It is of course true that the conduct at issue-enforcing a
non-discrimination policy to bar military recruiting-contains an
element of expression. However, the Supreme Court has
determined that so-called "expressive conduct" deserves a test
different from that for pure speech limitations. In United States
v. O'Brien, 39 a case dealing with an individual convicted of
burning his draft card in violation of federal law, the Court
recognized that certain conduct can have both speech and non-
speech elements. 140 Although the Solomon Amendment primarily
targets conduct, it does have an incidental effect on speech as law
schools have been forced to suspend their non-discrimination
policies, at least as applied to the military.' 41 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has cautioned that it "cannot accept the view that
an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech'
whenever the person . . . intends . . to express an idea." 142 In
O'Brien, the Court set forth a test to determine whether a
regulation that implicates conduct primarily and expression
incidentally is constitutional.1 43 The Court stated:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. 144
Under the O'Brien test, the Solomon Amendment should be
upheld over the challenges raised by the law student and faculty-
plaintiffs in FAIR I and Burt. As to the first part of the test, the
regulation is clearly within the Congress' power to raise and
support a military. 145 Indeed, the O'Brien Court urged that "[t]he
138 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(b).
139 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
140 See id. at 376.
141 See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
142 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
143 See id. at 376-77.
144 Id. at 377.
145 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and
to make all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and
sweeping." 146  In O'Brien, the Court upheld the power of the
government to set provisions for how the conscription of military
troops would be most efficiently accomplished, even though it
infringed on the plaintiffs freedom of expression. 147 It would be
passing strange to assert, as the plaintiffs challenging the
Solomon Amendment must, that even though Congress has the
capacity to draft citizens for military service and limit modes of
conduct that frustrate that end, it nevertheless lacks the
authority to govern the recruitment of military personnel simply
because a speech interest is incidentally involved.
Equally clear is that the Solomon Amendment passes the
second O'Brien prong by furthering the substantial governmental
interest of recruitment of service-members. The power of the
military to recruit citizens for service in the armed forces is both
permitted by the Constitution1 48 and mandated by Congress. 149
Again, the Court in O'Brien made it clear that "the Nation has a
vital interest in having a system for raising armies that functions
with maximum efficiency and is capable of easily and quickly
responding to continually changing circumstances."'150 Certainly,
having access to law schools to recruit Judge Advocates for the
various branches of the military is encompassed in the efficiency
principle outlined in O'Brien and likewise represents an
important federal interest.
The governmental interest of Congress in insisting on access
to institutions of higher education and students for the purposes
of military recruiting is "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression,"' 5' and thus, meets O'Brien's third prong. As
discussed above, the language of the Solomon Amendment does
not condition federal funding on the adoption or rejection of any
particular viewpoint with regard to the military; it simply
146 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (citing Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755-
58 (1948)).
147 See id. at 377-81.
148 See United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 854 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. granted,
377 U.S. 922 (1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (affirming Congress' power to recruit
forces).
149 See 10 U.S.C. § 503(a) (2000) (obliging the armed forces to "conduct intensive
recruiting campaigns to obtain enlistments").
150 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381.
151 Id. at 377.
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provides penalties to those colleges and universities that, for
whatever reason, prohibit the military's on-campus recruiting
efforts. 152
In O'Brien, the appellant was charged with destroying his
Selective Service registration card, which he did for the purpose
of protesting the draft and the Vietnam War. 153 The Court
upheld his conviction, even though the applicable law arguably
implicated his freedom of symbolic speech, because he was being
punished for the "noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and
for nothing else."'154 The same proposition holds as regards any
institutions that violate the proscriptions of the Solomon
Amendment. It is the act of frustrating the military's attempts
to access a particular campus that runs afoul of the Solomon
Amendment, not the message conveyed, if any, when an
institution does so. Presumably, a law school would risk losing
funds whether it closed its doors to the military in order to make
a statement about discrimination or if it did so because its
students had not fared well in seeking employment within the
JAG Corps.
The Solomon Amendment also comports with the fourth
O'Brien requirement as the regulation does not inhibit the
incidental concerns of the law schools any more than "is essential
to the furtherance of [the government's] interest."1 55  "Later
Supreme Court cases have stated that to satisfy the O'Brien
standard, 'a regulation need not be the least speech-restrictive
means of advancing the Government's interests."' 15 6 All that is
required of the Solomon Amendment to satisfy this prong is a
finding that the efforts of the military to recruit personnel "would
be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."' 57
It seems plair that the military's efforts to reach potential
service-members would be achieved less effectively if any
institution of higher learning could deny recruiters access to
campus and students. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
152 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West & Supp. 2005); see also supra notes 137-38 and
accompanying text.
153 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
154 Id. at 382.
155 Id. at 377.
156 FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 313 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994)).
157 Id. (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
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noted the "evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny
of legislative judgments will vary up or down with
the ... plausibility of the justification raised."'158  The
government's assertion that greater access to college campuses is
required to assist the military in its recruiting efforts seems
highly plausible. After all, a college education is required to be
commissioned as an officer in the military, 159 and a law degree is
required for acceptance into the JAG Corps. 160 Additionally, one
of the military's chief incentives in recruiting is its offer to help
enlisted men and women pay (or pay back) their college
expenses.161
Furthermore, as this matter directly concerns military
issues, the policy choice of the federal legislature to determine
the most effective means of recruiting should be given its proper
respect. As the authority of Congress in this realm is strikingly
extensive and explicit, the Supreme Court has cautioned that
"perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress
greater deference"'162 since "the scope of Congress' constitutional
power in this area [is] broad [and] the lack of competence on the
part of the courts is marked."'163
Although the actions of the law schools in barring military
recruitment to advance their belief in the principles of non-
discrimination seem to fall within the Supreme Court's
"expressive conduct" jurisprudence, the courts that have made
determinations on the issue have subjected the Solomon
Amendment to strict scrutiny as a violation of First Amendment
158 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).
159 See, e.g., About the Army, Officer, http://www.goarmy.com/about/officer.jsp
(last visited Sept. 16, 2005); Careers in the Navy, Officer, http://www.navy.com/
officer (last visited Sept. 16, 2005); U.S. Air Force, Officer Careers,
http://www.airforce.com/careers/officer/careers.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2005); U.S.
Marine Corps, Becoming a Marine Officer, http://www.marines.coml
officer-programs/becomingamarineofficer.asp?format=flash (last visited Sept. 16,
2005).
160 See Kim, supra note 10, at 36.
161 See, e.g., Air Force, Enlisted Education, Money for School,
http://www.airforce.com/education/enlisted/moneyForSchool.php (last visited Sept.
16, 2005); Explore the Navy, Education, http://www.navy.com/education (last visited
Sept. 16, 2005); U.S. Army, Benefits, Education, http://www.goarmy.coml
benefits/education.jsp (last visited Sept. 16, 2005); U.S. Marine Corps, Educational
Opportunities, http://www.marines.com/enlisted-marines/educationalopps.asp (last
visited Sept. 16, 2005).
162 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981).
163 Id. at 65.
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rights. 164 Nevertheless, the cases relied upon in finding that the
Solomon Amendment compels speech are equally unavailing to
the law schools. Beyond that, the dissimilarity between the facts
giving rise to findings of compelled speech and those in conflict
between the law schools and the military highlight the
appropriateness of the O'Brien test over those presented below.
2. Claims Based on the Doctrine of Compelled Speech
Both FAIR H and Burt held that the Solomon Amendment
compels speech on the part of the faculty-plaintiffs, which
constitutes a violation of their First Amendment freedoms. 165 A
constitutional violation based on compelled speech can occur in
any combination of three distinct ways. 166  The State may
impermissibly force a speaker to promulgate speech chosen by
the government, require the accommodation or inclusion of
another speaker's message, or mandate the subsidization of or
contribution "to an organization that engages in speech that the
individual opposes." 167  The essence of the courts' similar
holdings is that because of the dictates of the Solomon
Amendment, the institutions are compelled to either alter their
own message about discrimination 168  or assist in the
dissemination of the military's message. 169
The courts in FAIR II and Burt relied on a string of cases in
reaching the conclusion that the Solomon Amendment compels
speech. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
164 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 242-43 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
1977 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny); Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 187
(D. Conn. 2005) (same).
165 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 243; Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 175-78.
166 See FAIR I, 390 F.3d at 235-36.
167 Id. at 236.
168 See Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 178 ("The Solomon Amendment has forced the
Faculty to change their message from a categorical statement that 'employers who
discriminate ... are not welcome. . .' to an equivocal statement that includes the
disclaimer 'except for the military."').
169 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 240 ("[B]y distributing newsletters and posting
notices, the Solomon Amendment compels law schools to propagate the military's
message."). Again, it bears noting that the language of the law in no way requires
institutions of higher education to express any statement one way or the other
regarding the military's presence on campus. See supra note 137 and accompanying
text. The fact that law schools feel obliged to respond, either for reasons of
conscience or because of their voluntary membership in the Association of American
Law Schools is very different from the government compelling a particular response.
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Commission,170  the Supreme Court reversed a state
Commission's requirement that a privately owned utility must
include messages it opposes in the billing envelopes sent to its
customers. 171 The plaintiff would have been forced to provide a
forum for a particular organization with which it disagreed by
reserving space in its monthly statements four times a year.
72
The Court found that such a requirement would force the utility
company, which in effect distributed a small newspaper along
with its bills,173 to "alter [its] speech to conform with an agenda
[it did] not set... [and] help disseminate hostile views."'174
Reasoning by analogy, the court in FAIR II asserted that
"compelling] the schools to accommodate the military's message
in the recruiting-assistance programs [is] ... [1]ike the forced
inclusion of ... a statement in the extra space of a utility's billing
statement."' 75 Similarly, in Burt, the court cited to Pacific Gas &
Electric in urging that "[t]he right of the Faculty. . . to refrain
from aiding another in the latter's speech has been violated by
the Solomon Amendment requirement that the [school] include
DoD's recruiting message."'176
The analogy the courts pressed, however, fails in several
respects. First, there is no requirement in the Solomon
Amendment that is akin to the state Commission's directive that
a private utility must actually print and disseminate a statement
that is hostile to their own viewpoint. 77  There is also a
disconnect between the statements in a newsletter possibly being
altered because of fear of a hostile reply in a subsequent edition
of that same publication 78 and the perceived mixed message that
may be sent if a law school adopts a non-discrimination policy,
170 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
171 See id. at 20-21.
172 See id. at 5-7.
173 See id. at 8.
174 Id. at 9, 14.
175 FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 240 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005).
176 Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 178 (D. Conn. 2005).
177 Compare 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West & Supp. 2005) (establishing that funds
would be denied to institutions that deny military recruiters access to campuses and
students), with Pacific Gas & Electric, 475 U.S. at 12-14 (describing the
Commission's order to require Pacific Gas & Electric to help disseminate views
hostile to the utility's interests).
17s See Pacific Gas & Electric, 475 U.S. at 14 ("[The utility] must contend with
the fact that whenever it speaks out on a given issue, it may be forced ... to help
disseminate hostile views.").
2005]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
yet permits military recruiting. 179 To be sure, the law schools
have nowhere asserted that they have altered either the words or
the substance of their message out of concern for accommodating
a potentially unfriendly rejoinder from the military. For the
analogy to Pacific Gas & Electric to hold, the Solomon
Amendment would have to require the law schools to print the
military's antagonistic message 8 0 -and what that would be is
not entirely clear as the recruiter's function is to discuss
employment opportunities 18 1-in exactly the same manner that
their own viewpoints are published. This much the law does not
do.
The courts in FAIR II and Burt also relied on Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo18 2 in determining that the Solomon
Amendment compels speech.18 3 This case concerned the possible
assault on First Amendment liberties as a result of a Florida law
that required newspapers to grant political candidates equal
space to answer any criticism leveled at them by the
publication.184  Although the Supreme Court made clear in
Miami Herald that the constitutionality of the statute would be
reviewed in the context of the newspaper's First Amendment
press liberties,18 5 the case may stand for the general proposition
that private parties should not be compelled to advance opinions
with which they disagree, despite the ability to do so with little
extra cost and the capacity to disclaim the contents of the
message. 186
179 See Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
180 The concern in Pacific Gas & Electric was that since the utility company was
being forced to publish the views of an organization that was opposed to its views,
the company might not press its own viewpoints given the knowledge that an
adverse statement was not only sure to follow, but would be published at its expense
in the exact same forum. See Pacific Gas & Electric, 475 U.S. at 12-14.
181 The courts in FAIR II and Burt are clearly concerned that the law schools
are being compelled to propound an idea with which they disagree, but the cases do
not say what message the presence of a military recruiter sends. Presumably, since
the non-discrimination policies are concerned, inter alia, with sexual orientation
discrimination, the hostile message is that of the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
Policy, but there is no suggestion that the recruiters themselves are advancing that
particular message.
182 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
183 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 241 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005); Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 177 (D. Conn. 2005).
184 See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 243-44.
185 See id. at 243.
186 See id. at 257-58.
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The logic of Miami Herald was found to be equally applicable
in the free speech context to strike down the Solomon
Amendment.18 7  The court in FAIR II reasoned that "[b]y
requiring schools to include military recruiters in the
interviews .... the Solomon Amendment compels the schools to
accommodate the military's message ... [, and] [1l]ike the forced
inclusion of ... a response in a newspaper's editorial page, this is
compelled speech. s188 The court in Burt held that since compelled
speech was found even where a newspaper was not viewed as
endorsing a forced reply, the military cannot defend the Solomon
Amendment by asserting that the law schools would not be
viewed as endorsing the government's message.18 9  Such
comparisons, however, are faulty.
First, there is strong reason to believe that the holding of
Miami Herald was reached due to the free press concerns alone,
and that it is consequently inapplicable to any free speech
analysis. The opinion of the case both opens and closes with
concerns over the "right to reply" statute's effect on a free
press, 190 and contains continual references throughout to that
same concern.191 Moreover, the Court in Miami Herald was
particularly concerned with the kind of control editors and
publishers should have over the content of their newspapers.
92
The Court explained, "[t]he choice of material to go into a
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size
and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and
public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of
editorial control and judgment."1 93 Thus, it is plain that the chief
concern of the Court was the forced printing of any message, as a
curtailment of editorial freedom, rather than a more limited
concern for a newspaper having to publish statements with
which it might disagree. It is difficult to ascertain how the
Solomon Amendment infringes on such a freedom. The language
of the Florida "right to reply" statute could potentially compel
187 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 240; Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 176.
188 FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 240.
189 See Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 175-78.
190 See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 243, 257-58.
191 See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241 passim.
192 Id. at 256 ("Compelling editors or publishers to publish that which reason
tells them should not be published is what is at issue in this case.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
193 Id. at 258.
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newspapers to print statements whenever they wrote against a
particular candidate. 194 The Solomon Amendment itself does not
force the law schools to publish any military-approved message
as a response to the promulgation of a non-discrimination policy,
nor does it compel a reply to the message that the transient
presence of military recruiters on campus makes (whatever that
may be). 195 To be sure, law schools may indeed feel obligated to
counter the presence of military recruiters in order to advance
their own viewpoint on sexual orientation. But, such internal
policy choices are in no way compelled by the government or the
operation of the Solomon Amendment.
In holding that the Solomon Amendment compels speech, the
courts in FAIR II and Burt drew support from United States v.
United Foods, Inc. 196 In that case, the Supreme Court held that
the federal Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer
Information Act 197  (the "Mushroom Promotion Act")
impermissibly compelled speech by "impos[ing] mandatory
assessments upon handlers of fresh mushrooms ... [that] are
spent for generic advertising to promote mushroom sales." 198 The
Court noted that the issue at hand was whether the government
itself may endorse a certain viewpoint by compelling a specified
group of persons, some of whom object to the message, to pay a
direct subsidy toward that end.199 Though the Solomon
Amendment contains no such similar provision-the government
does not fund the military's recruiting message with law school
dollars-the courts in FAIR H and Burt reasoned that it is
unconstitutional to force the schools to indirectly subsidize
military recruiting through school employees and resources,200
even if the party being compelled can communicate its own
message effectively. 201 The language of the Court's opinion,
however, does not support such a broad interpretation. The
Court pointedly wrote, "First Amendment concerns apply here
because of the requirement that producers [of mushrooms]
194 See id. at 244.
195 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West & Supp. 2005).
196 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
197 7 U.S.C. §§ 6101-12 (2000).
198 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 408.
199 See id. at 410.
200 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 240 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005).
201 See Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 178-79 (D. Conn. 2005).
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subsidize speech with which they disagree."20 2
Thus, compulsion of speech was found in United Foods not
merely because the individuals challenging the Mushroom
Promotion Act felt they could not effectively disagree with a
hostile message, but rather because the whole purpose of the act
at issue was to force those individuals to directly fund the
message they opposed. 20 3 Additionally, there is little in the
opinion to buttress the notion that money spent incidental to the
demands of a particular federal law will give rise to a compelled
speech claim. In distinguishing a prior case where the Court
found no First Amendment deficiencies in a general scheme that
only secondarily involved the collection of assessments for
speech, 20 4 the Court wrote, "[As concerns the Mushroom
Promotion Act], for all practical purposes, the advertising itself,
far from being ancillary, is the principal object of the regulatory
scheme. '20  The Solomon Amendment neither seeks direct
subsidization of the military's recruiting message, nor is its
primary goal the advertising or dissemination of a particular
governmental viewpoint. Again, whatever its ancillary effects,
the Solomon Amendment is first and foremost concerned with the
recruitment of talented individuals for military service.
In determining that the Solomon Amendment compels
speech, both the FAIR II and Burt courts relied upon the holding
of Wooley v. Maynard.20 6  In Wooley, the Supreme Court
examined whether the state of New Hampshire could
constitutionally impose criminal sanctions on individuals who
made the state's motto, "Live Free or Die," illegible on their
license plates because they found it to be irreconcilable with their
faith as Jehovah's Witnesses. 20 7 The Court somewhat broadened
the issue to "whether the State may constitutionally require an
individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological
202 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410-11.
203 See id. at 411 ("First Amendment values are at serious risk if the
government can compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay
special subsidies for speech on the side that it favors . . ").
204 See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469-70 (1997)
(stressing that the approved regulations did not impose restraint on producers'
freedom to communicate and did not compel speech or financing of political or
ideological views).
205 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411-12.
206 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
207 Id. at 706-07.
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message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and
for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the
public."20 8  Such a requirement, the Court declared, was
unconstitutional. 209
The court in FAIR II found the Solomon Amendment
sufficiently analogous to the law at issue in Wooley and asserted
that "the Solomon Amendment compels law schools to propagate
the military's message. Like the forced display of an unwanted
motto on one's license plate,... this is compelled speech. ' 210 The
court in Burt likewise held that the rationale of Wooley should be
applied to the Solomon Amendment.211 However, there are
significant differences in the conditions imposed by the New
Hampshire law at issue in Wooley and those imposed by the
Solomon Amendment; thus, Wooley is unsuitable as precedent for
finding the Solomon Amendment unconstitutional.
First, the New Hampshire law made refusal to display the
state's message a crime, for which the plaintiff was ultimately
sentenced and required to serve jail time after he refused to pay
the previous two fines. 212 In contrast, the Solomon Amendment
only provides for the withholding of federally issued funds for
noncompliance. 213 Nonetheless, as noted above, the Supreme
Court did endorse a broader reading of the holding in Wooley. 214
There is a manifest difference between an individual being
compelled with the threat of fines and incarceration to operate as
a "mobile billboard"21 5 for an ideological message that is contrary
to his religious beliefs, and a law school being persuaded through
the use of government dollars to admit recruiters who only
indirectly represent policies with which a law school disagrees.
This is especially so given the ability of the law schools to
continue to propagate whatever message on discrimination they
choose.
Second, the difference between the forced display of a motto
and giving an incentive for the admission of military recruiters is
208 Id. at 713.
209 See id. at 714.
210 FAMR II, 390 F.3d 219, 240 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005).
211 See Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 180 (D. Conn. 2005).
212 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707-08.
213 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(a)-(b) (West & Supp. 2005).
214 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713.
215 Id. at 715.
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more than just one of degree. 216 With respect to the former, the
message being opposed is clear-it is literally written across the
back of every automobile-and is part of the very statute at issue
in the case. 217 As regards the latter, the message the law schools
oppose is several steps removed from the commands of the
Solomon Amendment. One article analyzing the issues involved
with the Solomon litigation described the government's message
as "the speech of the military, reflected in its anti-homosexual
'don't ask, don't tell' policy and embodied by the presence of its
recruiters speaking on campus."218 Even the recruiter's speech
only implicitly authorizes the discriminatory policy. It is clear
that several inferences are required to understand exactly what
the conflicting viewpoints are. The government's incentive for
allowing admission of military recruiters is distinct, conceptually
and constitutionally, from a situation where an individual must
display the state's conflicting message every time he or she
drives an automobile.
Third, the constitutional infringement at issue in Wooley was
far more serious a burden on the individual seeking to exercise
his religious beliefs than the Solomon Amendment is on law
schools. The Supreme Court noted that "[they] are faced with a
state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily
life-indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view-to
be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological
point of view he finds unacceptable." 21 9 By sharp contrast, the
Solomon Amendment is a federal law that encourages the law
schools, a few times a year, to not inhibit public awareness of
employment opportunities within an organization that has
policies contrary to its own. As the Solomon Amendment merely
prevents certain conduct, rather than affirmatively compel
individuals to disseminate a particular state viewpoint, it does
not present the same constitutional dangers as the scenarios that
fit more readily into the Supreme Court's compelled speech
jurisprudence.
216 But see Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 177 (discussing Supreme Court precedent in
the area of compelled speech and determining that government requirements that
only differ by degree can be equally unconstitutional).
217 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
218 Calvert & Richards, supra note 4, at 221 (citation omitted).
219 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
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B. Overcoming Challenges Based on a Right to Expressive
Association
The Solomon Amendment should also survive any challenges
arising out of the faculty-plaintiffs' right to expressive
association. 220 The Supreme Court has previously recognized
this First Amendment claim, stating that "[g]overnment actions
that may unconstitutionally burden this freedom may take many
forms, one of which is 'intrusion into the internal structure or
affairs of an association' like a 'regulation that forces the group to
accept members it does not desire."'221 In Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale,222 the Supreme Court determined that a state law that
compelled the Boy Scouts to accept an openly gay activist in a
leadership role of the organization transgressed the association's
right to advocate a particular viewpoint.223 The Court then
developed a three-part test to determine if a particular regulation
violates a group's right to expressive association.224
The Supreme Court first requires a showing that "the group
engages in 'expressive association. '"' 225 To meet this relatively
low threshold requirement, an organization need not be
dedicated to advocating a particular viewpoint; rather, "a group
must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or
private."226  Most assuredly, the faculty members in FAIR II,
Burt and Burbank meet this prong of the test. 227 Indeed, the
220 The FAIR II and Burt cases addressed this issue in different ways, yet the
case law relied upon and the analyses offered are similar enough to discuss the casesjointly. FAIR II discussed one of the free association-type claims as part of its free
speech analysis, stating that one example of compelled speech "is government action
that forces a private speaker to accommodate or include another private speaker's
message." FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 236 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977(2005). However, Burt analyzed free speech and freedom of expressive association as
two separate claims. See Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 175-87.
221 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (quoting Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
222 Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
223 See id. at 650-61.
224 See id. at 648, 656-57.
225 Id. at 648.
226 Id.
227 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 231 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005) ("[W]e agree with the District Court's conclusion that [law schools] qualify as
expressive associations."); Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 185 (D. Conn.
2005) ("[The law school] is clearly an expressive association for the purposes of First
Amendment analysis."). It is worth noting that the student-plaintiffs were not
allowed to proceed on this claim as they did not set the rules of the association
allegedly infringed upon. See supra Part III (discussing the claims against the
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plaintiffs in all three cases were part of the associations that
adopted and sought to enforce the non-discrimination policies at
issue. 228 Therefore, this ought to be viewed as an expression of
the plaintiffs' view that intolerance based on sexual orientation
should be opposed.
Second, the Court directs an analysis of whether forcing a
particular party into another association pursuant to the
regulation in question "significantly affect[s] its expression.
229
However, it is not enough for an organization to demonstrate
that accepting an unwanted party "would impair its message.
230
In Dale, the state law was improper not solely because it
required the Boy Scouts to include gay members, but rather
because the law would have demanded that Dale be given a
leadership role which would have "force[d] the organization to
send a message ... that [it] accepts homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior. '231 The court in FAIR II held that
the Solomon Amendment similarly required law schools to
condone the discriminatory policies of the military with which
they disagree.232 Ironically, the court further noted that "[j]ust as
the Boy Scouts believed that 'homosexual conduct is inconsistent
with the Scout Oath,'. . . the law schools believe that
employment discrimination is inconsistent with their
commitment to justice and fairness."233 The court in Burt drew a
similar comparison and noted that "as the inclusion of an open
homosexual in an organization opposed to homosexuality
obviously impaired the Boy Scouts' message in Dale, the
inclusion of the military in [the law school's] recruiting program
impairs its message [of nondiscrimination] ."234
There is indeed a "compelling analogy"235 between the issues
presented in Dale and those presented in the Solomon litigation.
government).
228 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 230-32; Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 159; Burbank v.
Rumsfeld, No. 03-5497, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509, at *1-5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19,
2004).
229 Dale, 530 U.S. at 656.
230 Id. at 653.
231 Id.
232 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 231-32 (suggesting that schools would be
communicating their approval of employment discrimination by allowing military
recruiters on campus).
233 Id. at 232 (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 652).
234 Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 186 (D. Conn. 2005).
235 FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 232.
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However, there are several fundamental differences between the
Solomon Amendment and the state law challenged in Dale.
First, the Solomon Amendment does not affirmatively mandate
that members of the military be allowed to join the association of
faculty at a particular law school in the same way that the public
accommodations law in Dale required the inclusion of a gay
scoutmaster in the Boy Scouts of America. Rather, it merely
requires that an academic institution that takes federal funds
cannot deny access to on-campus military recruiters. 236
Second, requiring access to a campus for the one or two times
a year a military recruiter will visit a law school 237 simply cannot
be viewed as having as significant an impact on expression 23 as
does providing someone with a leadership role in an organization
that expressly rejects that individual's way of life. The analogy
would hold only if the Solomon Amendment sought to make a
military recruiter not only a member of the faculty, but also an
individual with responsibility over setting policies.
Third, the Dale test requires a weighing of the First
Amendment free association interests against competing social
interests. 239 As this prong of the test is essentially a standard
strict scrutiny analysis,240 it will be treated below as it applies to
all of the First Amendment arguments relied upon by the law
schools. Before that, however, it is important to discuss other
arguments raised by the plaintiffs challenging the Solomon
Amendment. The cases that found for the plaintiffs relied upon
another First Amendment case from the Supreme Court that
ironically also involved limiting gay rights in the free association
context. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, Inc.,241 the Court struck down on First
236 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(a)-(d) (West & Supp. 2005) (declaring that if a school
prevents access to military recruiters, that school will be denied federal funds from
the Department of Defense and the Department of Education, among other federal
organizations).
237 See Kim, supra note 10, at 35 (detailing military recruiting practices during
both the fall and spring semesters).
238 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 656 (indicating that having a homosexual as assistant
scoutmaster-a role model in a place of authority-"would significantly affect [the
Boy Scouts'] expression [of disapproval of homosexuality]").
239 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 234 (using this third step to determine whether the
Solomon Amendment was constitutional).
240 See id. at 234 & n.14 (asserting that because the Solomon Amendment
"impairs law schools' expression, strict scrutiny will apply").
241 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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Amendment grounds a ruling by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts that had held that organizers of Boston's St.
Patrick's Day Parade could not bar the participation of marchers
based only on their sexual orientation. 242 The Supreme Court
reasoned that "[s]ince every participating unit affects the
message conveyed by the private organizers, the state courts'
[insistence on non-discrimination] produced an order essentially
requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their
parade."2
43
The courts in FAIR II and Burt both found the Solomon
Amendment to inhibit free or expressive association relied upon
Hurley in reaching that determination. In FAIR II, the court
maintained that the Solomon Amendment "compels the schools
to accommodate the military's message[,] ... [1]ike the forced
inclusion of a parade contingent. '244 In a similar vein, the court
in Burt held that since the law school argued that the Solomon
Amendment undermined the message of non-discrimination it
wished to convey, the Amendment "substantially interfere[d]
with the Faculty Members' ability to advocate their
viewpoint ... [and thus] 'require[d]' [the law school] 'to alter the
expressive content' of its policy."245 At first blush, the similarity
to Hurley seems striking-the law schools are being induced to
admit members to an activity, members that they would
otherwise like to exclude. However, the logic of Hurley only
makes sense in the context of inherently expressive activities. 246
The court in FAIR II recognized this necessary element and
determined that "recruiting is expression" as it contains a great
deal of communication between parties and aims to persuade
students to work for a particular employer.247
The Supreme Court supported a more limited definition of
expressive activities in Hurley than that offered in FAIR II. In
242 See id. at 559-64 (proclaiming that "private citizens who organize a parade"
cannot be forced to include a contingent that conveys a message of which the
organizers do not approve).
243 Id. at 572-73.
244 FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 240.
245 Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 187 (D. Conn. 2005) (quoting Hurley,
515 U.S. at 572-73).
246 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568 (differentiating between a parade, which conveys
a message, and an ordinary trip from one destination to another).
247 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 236-37 (explaining "[t]he expressive nature of
recruiting").
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discussing what would distinguish non-expressive activities from
the expressive activity of a parade, the Court noted that "the
parade does not consist of individual, unrelated segments that
happen to be transmitted together for individual selection by
members of the audience [and] [a]lthough each parade unit
generally identifies itself, each is understood to contribute
something to a common theme. ' 248 The definition of what a
parade is not serves as a precise definition of what the recruiting
process is. The individual participants in a recruitment program
are each present to serve their own interests-namely, finding
well-qualified potential employees-and are indeed "individual,
unrelated segments" of an overall program from which the
audience (law students) can pick and choose. 249 "Parades and
demonstrations, in contrast, are not understood to be so neutrally
presented or selectively viewed."250
The principle underlying the Court's holding in Hurley is
that certain activities are by themselves expressive and, as such,
selection of groups or individuals to participate in those activities
cannot be compelled without violating the First Amendment.251
This is so because an organization's involvement in an expressive
activity "would likely be perceived as having resulted from" the
organizer's choice to make the particular statement represented
by that participant.252 There is no risk of this occurring with law
schools because the Solomon Amendment leaves them free to
disavow the government's message in virtually any way they
choose, save one-the barring of military recruiters from campus.
Contrary to the position espoused in FAIR II, there is good
reason to hold that a parade organizer cannot be forced to include
certain contingents in that activity, while a law school can be
denied a seemingly similar right. The crucial distinction here
does not depend as much on the nature of the organizer as it does
on the nature of the activity involved. Since parades are
expressive in a way that recruiting is not, the organizer is as free
248 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576.
249 Id.; see generally Ginsburg & Wolf, supra note 3 (discussing the on-campus
recruiting process).
250 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576.
251 See id. at 574-75 (announcing that if a speaker does not wish to promote a
particular point of view, "that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government's
power to control").
252 Id. at 575 (relating how choosing to include a certain parade contingent
shows support for that contigent).
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to control the content of the parade in the same way he is free to
control the content of any more conventional statement he might
make. To illustrate this point in Hurley, Justice Souter drew on
the metaphor of a parade as a musical score and its organizer as
the composer. 253 An equally apt metaphor is to understand the
parade arranged by an organizer as comparable in First
Amendment value to a sentence uttered by a speaker. The
organizer "selects the expressive units of the parade from
potential participants" 25 4 in the same way a speaker selects the
message of a sentence from all available words. The only reason
selection of participants in the parade context has constitutional
dimensions is because of the inherent expressive nature of the
activity. Recruiting is simply not imbued with such
communicative characteristics, and thus, the Solomon
Amendment does not inhibit expressive association.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that the Solomon Amendment
has presented any burden whatsoever to the expression of the
law schools' message of non-discrimination. 255 In fact, the AALS
made it plain that a law school would only be excused from
noncompliance with its recommended non-discrimination policy if
a member school took steps "to ameliorate the detrimental effects
of the discrimination coerced by Solomon."256 A report by the
Chair of the AALS Section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues,
disseminated after passage of the Solomon Amendment, goes so
far as to cite examples of how law schools have opposed what
they view as the military's message of discrimination and further
provides suggestions for effective ameliorative measures. 257 Like
their faculty counterparts, law students have also not seen their
right to criticize the government inhibited by the Solomon
Amendment. Indeed, "some of the most effective means of
253 See id. at 574.
254 Id.
255 See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 306 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005). In assessing the plaintiffs' similar
expressive association claims as to the burden the Solomon Amendment imposes on
law faculty, the district court wrote, "the message of non-discrimination is at the
heart of the annual controversy [over allowing on-campus military recruiting], and is
therefore re-played and re-endorsed every time there is a controversy on any law
school campus." Id.
256 Valdes, supra note 4, at 395-96.
257 See generally Valdes, supra note 4, 365, 396-98, 418 (discussing, among
other things, the "balanced approach" urged by the AALS's "ten principles" for
"excused non-compliance").
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amelioration come not from the administration, but from the
students."258  Though these actions seem to demonstrate
unhappiness with the Solomon Amendment, they also show that
the law has not, in fact, burdened the expressive association of
the law school community.
C. The Solomon Amendment Withstands Strict Scrutiny
Even if the Solomon Amendment was found to impinge upon
First Amendment rights, it is nonetheless narrowly tailored to a
compelling governmental interest.259 The government's interest
in having access to college campuses has already been shown to
be extremely high.260 In fact, both FAIR 11 and Burt, in assessing
this prong of the test as applied to the Solomon Amendment,
found that the government's interest in raising an effective
military is at least compelling.261 However, since the Dale test
requires applying strict scrutiny to the federal law, neither court
found that the Solomon Amendment was narrowly tailored
enough to pass constitutional muster. 262 While the court in Burt
focused on the lack of proof that the government offered to
support its narrow tailoring argument, 263 the court in FAIR II
asserted that the government's means did not suit its ends
because it "ha[d] ample resources to recruit through alternative
means."264  The courts are indeed correct that the Solomon
Amendment serves a compelling government interest. However,
whether the assertion is that the government has failed to
present sufficient proof or that it has other recruiting means at
its disposal, the law in question is nevertheless the most
appropriate means to meet the government's compelling goal of
military recruitment.
The military and the federal government surely possess
258 Law, supra note 4, at 128.
259 See, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986)
(stating that even if protected speech is hampered, an order restricting First
Amendment rights could be held valid if a compelling state interest is achieved by
narrowly tailored means).
260 See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (describing the government's
compelling interest in on-campus recruiting).
261 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 234 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005); Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 187 (D. Conn. 2005).
262 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 234-35; Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 187.
263 See Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 187.
264 FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 235.
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sufficient resources to conduct methods of recruiting that do not
involve their presence at law school recruiting programs. 265 That
notwithstanding, those alternative methods would not produce
the military's desired results as on-campus recruiting and access
to a law school's career placement office remain the most
effective tools a legal employer has to attract law students.266 A
survey of the career placement offices of some of the nation's
premiere law schools as well as the breadth of participation in
their recruiting programs by legal employers bears this out.2
67
For instance, the Career Development Office of Yale Law School
(the faculty of which, incidentally, were the plaintiffs in the Burt
case) notes that "over 250 employers" attend their interview
programs 268 and that "[tihe majority of second-year students
obtain summer positions through" those programs. 269 Summer
positions are clearly a crucial part of the legal recruitment
process according to a recent survey on legal hiring conducted by
the National Association of Law Placement ("NALP"), which
found that roughly 91% of summer employees received offers for
a full-time associate position. 27° The Career Services Office of the
265 See id. at 234-35 (detailing alternative recruitment methods to which the
military may avail itself).
266 The dissent in FAIR II noted the reality and import of the legal hiring
process, arguing "[ilt is important for private employers to appear on campus to
recruit law school graduates for positions ... replete with interviews, followed by
dinners and parties, but somehow the military will [be expected to] recruit its
lawyers without appearing on campus." FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 255 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting).
267 See, e.g., Harvard Law School Office of Career Services, What We Do,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/ocs/AboutOCS/What We Do.htm (last visited Sept. 16,
2005) ("Each year, the OCS coordinates over 10,000 interviews with over 800
employers for HLS students."); New York University School of Law Office of Career
Services, On-Campus Recruiting Programs, http://www.law.nyu.edu/depts/
careerservices/recruiting/index.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2005) ("During 2003-2004,
over 557 private law firms, public interest organizations, government agencies,
corporations, and public accounting firms visited NYU School of Law to interview
J.D. students."); Stanford Law School Office of Career Services, Recruiting,
http://www.law.stanford.edu/adminlocs/employers/recruiting (last visited Sept. 16,
2005) ("The majority of our 2L and 3L students participate in, and find employment
through, [the Fall Campus Interview] program.").
268 YALE LAW SCHOOL CAREER DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, INTRODUCTION TO
CAREER DEVELOPMENT 2005-2006, at 4, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
outside/pdf/CareerDevelopment/cdo-Intro-guide.pdf.
269 Id. at 10.
270 NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, PERSPECTIVES ON FALL 2004 LAW
STUDENT RECRUITING 13 (2005), available at http://www.nalp.org/assets/
34_fall04.pdf.
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Columbia Law School further boasts that "[o]ur on-campus
interview programs and in office resources are the source for
employment for over 80% of our graduating JD class. '271 Given
the fact that so many employers consider attendance at law
school recruiting programs essential to attracting potential
employees and that such recruiting programs are phenomenally
successful, there is strong evidence to suggest that the only way
the military can fulfill its mandate to "conduct intensive
recruiting campaigns to obtain enlistments" 272 is to ensure its
access to on-campus recruiting programs at law schools. Thus,
the Solomon Amendment contemplates the most effective and
narrowly tailored means toward achieving the compelling
interest of maintaining the armed forces.
CONCLUSION
Congressional policies and objectives that further the
interests of the military are often viewed as highly controversial.
Nowhere, perhaps, is this more true than in the academic
setting,273 especially when such a policy forces academic
institutions to make a Hobson's choice between complying with a
federal policy by compromising on an issue of principle or
rejecting the policy at the risk of losing substantial amounts of
federal funds that directly subsidize the important work being
done at colleges and universities. Nevertheless, the Constitution
does not always reconcile crises of conscience. For better or
worse, Congress has enjoyed considerable latitude in the exercise
of its spending power in furthering the objectives it deems
important at a particular moment in time,274 especially as
concerns the military.275
Congress' power, and its responsibility, is remarkably broad
when it comes to its constitutional duty to build and maintain an
271 Columbia Law School Office of Career Services, Employers,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/careers/career-services/employers (last visited Sept.
16, 2005) (emphasis added).
272 10 U.S.C. § 503(a) (2000).
273 See Calvert & Richards, supra note 4, at 209 ("[T]he battle over the Solomon
Amendment really amounts to a classic clash between the conservative military
machine.., and the elite liberal confines of academia.").
274 See, James V. Corbelli, Note, Tower of Power: South Dakota v. Dole and the
Strength of the Spending Power, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1097, 1104-05 (1988) ("The
Court has increasingly allowed a strong and liberal use of the spending power.").
275 See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
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effective military. It goes without saying that even those
sweeping powers of Congress cannot trammel the individual
rights guaranteed by the First and Fifth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. Indeed, this Note in no way seeks to
present such a bold proposition. Rather, the foregoing asserts
that the Solomon Amendment simply does not operate in such a
way as to implicate First and Fifth Amendment guarantees, at
least not more than incidentally. Consequently, the concerns of
those law students and faculty who take umbrage with the law
and seek to oppose the military's message must yield to the
federal government's necessary and proper function of continuing
to recruit talented and highly educated individuals for service in
the nation's armed forces. This is especially so since there is still
considerable question as to how much law schools have even had
to restrict their protest of military policy as a result of the
Solomon Amendment.
The right of individuals to express their disagreement with
any of the government's policies is not hindered by the presence
of military recruiters on campus. An honest survey of the actions
taken by law students and faculty since the controversial bill
became law reveals that the Solomon Amendment leaves firmly
intact the careful balance of the government's need for military
recruitment and the right of individuals to express their
opposition to military policies in the academic setting. Perhaps
law schools would do a greater service by treating the present
controversy less as an "academic exercise"276 and more as an
276 FAIR II, 390 F.3d 219, 255 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005) (Aldisert, J., dissenting). In a particularly pointed and noteworthy dissent,
Judge Aldisert wrote:
What disturbs me personally and as a judge is that the law schools seem
to approach this question as an academic exercise, a question on a
constitutional law examination or a moot court topic, with no thought of the
effect of their action on the supply of military lawyers and military
judges .... Somehow, Appellants urge, better law graduates will be
attracted to the military legal branches with its lower pay and fewer
benefits by some other recruiting method .... There is no explanation,
however, why the law schools consider it important to have private national
law firms come to campus and boast about first year associates' salaries
and signing bonuses and emphasize that if the students want to clerk for a
federal judge for a year, the firm will add another bonus.... But we don't
want military recruiters to pollute our students. No, say the law schools,
what's sauce for the private sector goose is not sauce for the military
gander. No, say the law schools, we don't need a level playing field; let the
military shift for themselves.
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opportunity to engage the government in a fruitful dialogue while
exposing the nation's top law students to every possible career
choice.
In its demand for total exclusion of military recruiters from their
campuses, "fair play" is not a phrase in the law schools' lexicon.
[Vol. 79:689
